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IIASA Executive Reports communicate the findings of 
research conducted at and in collaboration with IIASA to  a wide 
readership, especially those who can put the findings into effect, 
such as executives in government and industry. 
This Executive Report derives from IIASA Research Report 
RR-80-30, Possible Climatic Consequences of a Man-Made Global 
Warming, by H. Flohn. It is based on research undertaken at 
IIASA in 1977 in conjunction with the Institute's Energy Systems 
Program, and makes use of information available up to  March 
1980. The work explored the interaction between energy and 
climate, including the impact on the global climate of three main 
energy sources: solar, nuclear, and fossil fuels. Its findings describe 
the global warming effects caused by carbon dioxide released by 
burning fossil fuels and by other trace gases released into the 
atmosphere. 
The approach is paleoclimatic - it gains insights into what 
global warmirig will produce by considering what is known about 
past periods of the earth's history when the global average surface 
temperature was higher than it is now. The only other way to 
study the processes of the climatic system is with models. Both 
approaches have considerable shortcomings: no complete model of 
the climate system has yet been devised, paleoclimatic knowledge 
is limited, and the conditions of past periods differ from conditions 
today. However, by using both approaches, and combining the two 
to some extent, we can advance our knowledge of the global 
climate. 
The IIASA research summarized in this Executive Report 
represents an admittedly speculative, yet carefully calculated 
global-warming scenario suggesting some dramatic changes in the 
global climate that could occur over the coming decades largely as 
a result of burning fossil fuels. It makes interesting reading for 
decision makers with responsibilities for energy development. 
WOLF H X F E L E  
Program Leader 
Energy Systems Program Group 
Twenty years ago, if you had invited scientists to an inter- 
national conference on global warming, you very likely could have 
held your sessions around a coffee table. Since then the subject has 
caught on dramatically, so that recent global warming get-togethers 
have been frequent and bustling - a workshop on Carbon Dioxide, 
Climate & Society and a follow-up meeting at IIASA in 1978; the 
1979 World Climate Conference sponsored primarily by United 
Nations agencies; and in 1980, another IIASA workshop and two 
sponsored by the Aspen Institute. 
The interest in global warming, like the problem itself, sim- 
mered awhile before boiling. In 1899, the American geologist 
Thomas Chamberlin sounded an early alarm. A frequent contri- 
butor to the Journal o f  Geology - best known for his hypothesis 
that the planets had spun off from the sun - Chamberlin attempted 
in one article to identify an atmospheric basis for glacial epochs 
and noted almost in passing that carbon dioxide released in the 
process of burning fossil fuels could warm the lower atmosphere 
and the surface of the earth. 
The idea was elaborated by the Swedish physicist and chemist 
Svante Arrhenius, a founder of modern physical chemistry. 
Arrhenius published the second volume of his textbook on cosmic 
physics, complete with a description of the global warming process, 
in 1903, the same year that he received a Nobel Prize for earlier 
work on galvanic conduction in electrolytes. 
Much was learned about global warming during the next six 
decades, but the knowledge caused little stir. In 1963, for instance, 
the Ford Foundation's encyclopedic Resources in America's 
Future: Patterns of Requirements & Availabilities: 1960-2000 
said not a word about global warming. Compare that with a 
similarly ambitious inquiry recently published in two volumes 
by the US Council on Environmental Quality: The Global 2000 
Report to the President, which offers yes, no, and maybe scenarios 
for man-made global warming, and concludes: "The increased car- 
bon dioxide concentrations implied by a continuation of present 
trends have momentous importance." 
Official commissions began talking about the momentous- 
ness of the problem after Inadvertent Climate Modification: Report 
o f  the Study o f  Man's Impact on Climate was published by M.I.T. 
Press in 197 1. Here were eminent international scientists firmly 
opposed to the conventional assumption that the global climate 
system was too big, stable, and resilient to  be altered by the emis- 
sions of exhaust pipes and chimneys. Some of these scientists 
thought global warming had already begun; all agreed that global 
warming was possible. 
The greenhouse and the sinks 
The possibility of man-made global warming results from the 
"greenhouse effect," (although what occurs in greenhouses is not 
the same). As carbon dioxide increases in the atmosphere, the visible 
shortwave portion of the radiation spectrum still gets through 
from the sun t o  the earth about as well as ever. However, as heat is 
then radiated back from the earth in the infrared longwave range, 
it increasingly tends to  be trapped in the atmosphere and radiated 
right back to  earth. And since carbon dioxide spreads evenly through 
the atmosphere, all the world becomes a greenhouse. 
Before the expansion of modern industry in the late 19th 
century, the atmospheric carbon dioxide content is believed to 
have been between 270 and 295 parts per million by volume (ppm). 
Today it is something like 338 ppm, up about 15 to 20 percent 
from pre-industrial levels. 
Roughly five billion tons of carbon go up in smoke every 
year, but only about half this amount is known to  stay up. The 
rest remains a mystery. About 2 billion tons may simply dissolve 
in water. But while the oceans are surely a net sink for carbon, 
the earth's greenery remains suspect. Plants absorb carbon di- 
oxide in the photosynthesis process, true. But dead plants and 
humus release the gas into the atmosphere. So does burning wood. 
Deforestation at today's pace, particularly in the tropics, may add 
more carbon dioxide to the atmosphere than the vegetation of 
the earth can absorb. 
There is doubt, then, about where atmospheric carbon dioxide 
comes from, where it goes, and whether the rate of increase will 
change. Nor is there any certainty about future petroleum and 
coal consumption rates. Furthermore, too little is known about 
external influences on climate - solar activity, volcanic activity, 
changes in the earth's orbit, rotation, and tides - to  say for sure 
whether the global climate will get warmer because of man's 
interference in the carbon cycle, or  cooler despite it. 
But the real problems come in trying to  convert atmospheric 
carbon dioxide increases into estimates of global warming and 
then to  determine for specific regions what effect the global warm- 
ing would have on the local climate. 
There are two ways to  predict global warming: by building 
models and by making analogies with warmer times. So far, both 
methods have had serious drawbacks. The current generation of 
models suffers because feedbacks among climatic subsystems are 
complex, and some processes have not yet been well described. 
For example, there is uncertainty about the amount of heat 
deep oceans absorb. Another uncertainty for today's modelers 
is the way clouds may form after global warming. There are also 
problems with predicting climate on a regional scale. 
Simply making analogies with periods when the earth was 
warmer has two main drawbacks. One is the limited amount of 
information. The other is that if you go backward in global history 
to a time when global temperatures were anything more than 
slightly higher than they are today, you are dealing with entirely 
different boundary conditions - vegetation lines, sea levels, glacia- 
tion, even mountain formations and placement of continents. A 
climate with higher global temperatures in the near future might 
not imitate similarly warm periods of the distant past. 
A paleoclima tic panorama 
Because of its urgency, complexity, and scope, global warming 
has emerged within a decade as a major scientific challenge. IIASA's 
interest in the subject began in the early stages of its Energy Sys- 
tems Program, which has just completed and published results of a 
seven-year project on the development of future energy scenarios 
over the next 50 years. In 1977, Professor Hermann Flohn of the 
Meteorological Institute, University of Bonn, joined the Energy 
Systems Program to study the interaction of energy and climate. 
While at IIASA, Flohn did extensive research on global warming 
and prepared a report on this topic. 
Flohn's work, updated to March 1980, is now available in 
two forms. IIASA RR-80-30 Possible Climatic Consequences o f  a 
Man-Made Global Warming is the technical research report. The 
report you are reading aims to put Flohn's findings in layman's 
language and add related information to  provide a general intro- 
duction to  the global warming problem. 
Flohn makes comprehensive analogies with warmer times. 
From the best models now available, he takes readings of the 
future global average surface temperature (GAST). He modifies 
the figures to  allow for other "greenhouseeffect" gases released 
to  the atmosphere by man, such as nitrous oxide, methane, ammo- 
nia, and the chlorofluoromethanes. With temperatures and times 
roughly established (from a 1 "C increase in GAST by 2000-201 0 
to a 4 "C increase by 2040-2080), he then looks to past times 
when temperatures were similar. 
To develop his global warming scenario, Flohn taps a store of 
information about the earth's history that has accumulated in 
several fields of science. He studies four periods with GASTs like 
those that may lie ahead: the early Middle Ages (1 000 years ago), 
the warmest peak of the present Holocene interglacial period 
(6000 years ago), the previous interglacial (120,000 years ago), 
and a long stretch of the late Tertiary (2.5-12 million years ago) 
when the Arctic Ocean was ice-free and the Antarctic Continent 
was buried under about as much ice and snow as exist there today. 
An ice-free north pole and a markedly asymmetric climate 
system aren't the only surprises for laymen in Flohn's paleoclimatic 
panorama. It is as if a fast-motion film of earth had been made 
from a point in space. GAST rises 1 "C and the forests of Canada 
and Siberia advance northward. Land where cereal crops can be 
grown increases. But fresh water starts to dwindle in California, 
Spain, and the Near and Middle East. Severe winters occur at the 
latitudes of many of the industrial cities of the northern hemi- 
sphere. 
With GAST at 1.5 "C, Canadian and Siberian forests reach 
200-300 kilometers further north than present lines. The Sahel 
region of Africa becomes verdurous again, and subtropical deserts 
shrink both north and south of the equator. At 2.5 "C, sea level 
has risen 5 to  7 meters. Scandinavia becomes an island. Deciduous 
trees grow on the northern coasts of North America, Europe, and 
Asia. But as the earth approaches a GAST 4 "C higher than it is 
today, summer droughts become frequent and increasingly severe 
in much of the temperate zones, and the Arctic ice disappears. 
And so on. One could wish, however, for more development 
of the script. Paleoclimatic data are spotty and lack parallels. Here 
we count salt layers under the Mediterranean, there we inspect 
Alaskan insect fossils, yonder we note ice-rafted pebbles in sub- 
antarctic seas. But while the paleoclimatic facts at hand cannot 
give us the overall description of global warming that global 
climate models aspire to, paleoclimatic scenarios can suggest 
what is ahead on a regional basis - which the models have yet to 
do convincingly. 
Other scientists have investigated past warming, particularly 
where good synoptic meteorological information is available. But 
Flohn is a pioneer in the development of a complete paleoclimatic 
scenario for the effects of global warming over the next 100 years, 
and his work serves as a cornerstone for the paleoclimatic approach. 
The burning of fossil fuels may trigger the greatest single 
anthropogenic change in environmental history. It may eventually 
be possible to prepare better for this future - and if necessary 
prevent it - by studying aspects of life on a warmer earth. 
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Man may be changing the climate of the earth. Scientists are 
concerned in particular that burning fossil fuels (coal, petroleum, 
and natural gas) adds carbon dioxide to  the global atmosphere, 
which could cause the surface temperatures of the earth to rise. 
What man-made global warming would mean is not yet clear. 
Despite much progress in climate-related research, scientists still 
lack a complete understanding of climatogenic processes and how 
they interact. Without such knowledge, reliable long-term predic- 
tions of climate are impossible. 
The need for such predictions, though, is great. Evidence 
accumulates to show that the earth has always been subject t o  
dramatic changes in climate, and man's rising population may 
increase his vulnerability to them. A mere 1 "C increase in what 
scientists call the global average surface temperature could cause 
problems in many areas. 
Short-term, local changes in climate also have eluded predic- 
tion, and they too cause suffering. A good example is the 1958 
drought that displaced millions of people in northeastern Brazil. 
More recently, atypical conditions have increased concern about 
the prospect of climatic change. The year 1980 exhibited unusually 
heavy rains in Europe and a severe heat wave in North America, 
while the spring of 198 1 saw rare snows in England and unex- 
pectedly heavy rains in Somalia and Ethiopia after a three-year 
drought. 
The uncertainties of climate have stimulated much debate 
among scientists. Because the subject is both controversial and 
highly topical, a research report published in 1980 by the Inter- 
national Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) is of wide 
interest. The executive report you are reading has been taken 
largely from that paper: Possible Climatic Consequences of a Man- 
Made Global Warming, by Professor (emeritus) Hermann Flohn of 
the Meteorological Institute, University of Bonn. Additional mate- 
rial on the subject presented here comes from other IIASA research 
and conference proceedings. 
The Flohn paper contemplates the climatic changes that 
global warming might produce. It bases a scenario for warming on 
the paleoclimatic information now available. The scenario is specula- 
tive, and it must be noted that the experts are not in full agreement 
on the evidence supporting it. Nevertheless, Flohn has provided 
a glimpse of some climatic possibilities by drawing extensively on 
"A mere 1 O C  increase in what scientists call the global 
average surface temperature could cause problems in many 
areas. " 
the climatic information now at hand. In addition, he offers much 
of interest t o  the nonscientist who wants to  gain an understanding 
of today's anomalous climatic conditions and what they may 
mean for tomorrow. 
The earth as a greenhouse 
Man changes his local climate by polluting the air, producing 
heat, and altering the surface of the earth. So far there is no sure 
evidence that these activities influence climate in a global way. But 
the amount of carbon dioxide in the global atmosphere has been 
rising since man began to burn fossil fuels on a large scale in the 
latter half of the 19th century. At present, the carbon dioxide 
content of the atmosphere is about 15 to 20 percent greater than 
it was before 1860. 
Further gains of carbon dioxide and certain other gases in 
the atmosphere could cause what scientists call the "greenhouse 
effect." As these gases are added to  the atmosphere, heat from the 
visible shortwave portion of the radiation spectrum gets through 
from the sun to  the earth nearly as well as before. But the heat 
reflected from the earth is part of the longwave, infrared portion 
of the spectrum and tends to be absorbed or radiated back to  the 
earth by the gases man has added to  the atmosphere. Solar heat 
that otherwise would be reflected off the earth to  outer space gets 
trapped and raises temperatures at the surface of the earth. (The 
term "greenhouse effect" is imprecise. It occurs in real greenhouses, 
but most of a greenhouse's heat gets trapped because the glass 
roof keeps warm air in.) 
At present, no one can say for sure what a hotter earth would 
mean, because truly comprehensive models of the earth's climatic 
system as a whole are not yet available. Such models must represent 
a complex, interacting system of atmosphere, oceans, soil and 
vegetation, and snow and ice. Within these systems are various sub- 
systems that take vastly different periods to  act: some atmospheric 
changes occur over a few days; by contrast, the gradual buildup 
of the Antarctic ice dome has taken many millions of years. This 
range of time scales greatly hampers model building. 
Climatogenic processes are of two categories. Most of them 
are internal, resulting from natural feedback within the global 
climatic system. A few are external, such as changes in climate 
caused by variations in solar radiation and by explosive volcanic 
eruptions. While it remains impossible to  foresee many aspects of 
future climate, conditional predictions, where one asks what the 
climatic consequences of a given process would be, may be feasible. 
The formation and melting of polar sea ice is a major internal 
climatogenic process. Historical variations in Arctic sea ice and in 
the Antarctic continental ice sheet have been considerable. The 
Antarctic ice is now probably partially unstable, which eventually 
could cause catastrophic ice surges or deglaciation of western 
Antarctica. Global atmospheric circulation is asymmetrical because 
of the contrast between the Arctic ocean's thin cover of drift ice 
and the Antarctic continent's heavy glaciation. 
Sensitive interactions between the atmosphere and the oceans 
in regions of frequent oceanic upwelling are another important 
internal climatogenic process. Upwelling, which occurs along the 
equator and some coasts, causes cooling and reduces evaporation 
from the ocean t o  the atmosphere. Downwelling has the opposite 
effect. 
Among climatic changes produced or  triggered by man, 
atmospheric increases in carbon dioxide and other gases are poten- 
tially the most important, and the only man-made changes sus- 
pected of having global effects already. Attempts to  model the 
relation between increases in the gases and global warming must deal 
with the long residence times of the gases (between five and fifty 
years), their mixing throughout the atmosphere, and their combined 
greenhouse effect in absorbing radiation, which Flohn estimates 
to be about 50% greater than the effect of carbon dioxide alone. 
Today's global average surface temperature is roughly esti- 
mated at 15 " C .  The best models available indicate that doubling 
the carbon dioxide content of the atmosphere would raise annual 
mean temperatures at the earth's surface by an average of 2 " or 
3 "C in the low and middle latitudes. In polar latitudes with snow 
and ice, the warming could be 5-10 "C, and there may be various 
seasonal changes as well. Nitrous oxide (a product of nitrogen 
fertilizers and aircraft fuel combustion) and other trace gases add 
50% to the effect of carbon dioxide, and this accelerates global 
warming. 
Some possible climatic futures 
Flohn estimates future temperature evolution by applying 
selected carbon dioxide growth rates t o  the most reliable radiation 
models for the relation between carbon dioxide content of the 
atmosphere and temperature. Then he selects thresholds of tem- 
perature increase to  represent warm phases during the earth's his- 
tory. He assumes no major changes in such external factors as 
solar radiation. 
Flohn speculates that global temperatures may become 0.5 "C 
higher than present levels sometime between 1990 and 2000. His 
scenario considers four somewhat hotter periods of the past - 
when average annual temperatures at  the surface of the earth 
were higher than now by 1 "C, 1.5 "C, 2.5 "C, and 4 "C. Global 
warming of 4 "C could occur after 2050, with an ice-free Arctic 
ocean and a glaciated Antarctic continent. Such conditions existed 
from 12 million to  2.5 million years ago. 
Flohn's phase three is the interglacial period 120 000 years 
levels, vegetation, mountain formations, and others - interact with 
temperatures, affecting them and being affected by them. The 
farther back the phase in the earth's climatic history, the more 
these conditions vary from today's. Accordingly, each of the four 
paleoclimatic phases he cites are the most recent times when global 
warming has reached the temperatures described. 
His first warmer phase is the early Middle Ages about 1,000 
years ago, a time when global temperatures were about 1 "C higher 
than now. Cereal was then cultivated in Iceland, and Vikings set- 
tled in southern Greenland. Tree lines in European mountains 
were at higher altitudes, and Canadian forests were as much as 100 
kilometers farther north. 
By the early Middle Ages, sea ice around Greenland had 
retreated, and this caused cyclones to track farther northward, 
producing frequent droughts all over Europe. These drought con- 
ditions, if repeated, could be among the more devastating effects 
of global warming, and they could come in little more than two 
decades, according to an estimate Flohn derives from climatic 
models and his own calculations. 
The second warmer phase is the peak of the Holocene warm- 
ing period about 6,000 years ago, a time when the global average 
surface temperature was 1.5 "C higher than it is now. This pro- 
duced more humidity almost everywhere, but particularly in the 
Learning more and knowing less 
The oceans in particular exert a powerful influence on  the earth's 
climates, yet we have inadequate oceanographic observations on 
the space and time scales needed for climatic studies. The impor- 
tant heat, moisture, and momentum exchanges that occur a t  the 
sea surface, and the corresponding transports that occur within 
the ocean, are not at all well known. Recent observations from 
the Mid-ocean Dynamics Experiment (MODE) reveal energetic 
oceanic mesoscale motions at subsurface levels, and our ignorance 
becomes even greater than we thought it was. 
- Understanding CIimatic Change, National 
Academy of Sciences, Washington. D.C., 
1975. 
currently arid belt of the Sahara Desert and the Middle East, 
which then was largely semiarid grassland, densely populated 
by cattle-raising nomads - conditions not likely to  return. 
Despite the warmth of Eurasia and Africa 6,000 years ago, 
eastern North America stayed relatively cool, especially in summer. 
This produced predominantly southwesterly winds over the 
Atlantic, which in turn probably intensified the Gulf Stream's 
northward-flowing branches. Canadian and eastern Siberian 
forests were 200-300 kilometers farther north than now. 
Flohn's phase three is the interglacial period 120,000 years 
ago, when the average temperature was about 2.5 "C higher than 
now. Seas were from five to seven meters higher than today, 
which suggests a partial disintegration of the western Antarctic 
ice sheet. This higher sea level affected vegetation and coastlines 
everywhere. The sea penetrated deeply into northern and eastern 
Europe and western Siberia. Scandinavia was isolated from the 
continent. 
The climate was moister than today. Forests extended all 
the way to northern coastlines where Arctic drift ice had retreated 
well away from land. Greater warmth and more moisture in the 
northern temperate zone could produce more arable land, despite 
inundated coastlines. However, a global average surface tempera- 
ture 2.5 "C warmer than today's could cause migrations from 
some areas affected by heat and drought, particularly in the 
subtropics. 
It is also worth noting that this hottest of interglacial periods 
(of the last 2.5 million years) ended abruptly. Most interglacials 
cool rapidly, but this one had ice accumulating at the poles so fast 
that sea levels appear t o  have dropped 60-70 meters within hardly 
more than 1,000 years. There is speculation that clustered volcanic 
eruptions may have contributed to  cooling. 
The fourth and last warm phase Flohn considers occurred 
just before the glacial-interglacial period that continues today. 
For 10 million years before this time, the Arctic ocean was ice- 
free. If global temperatures rose 4 OC, a possibility by 2050 if 
man releases greenhouse-effect gases into the atmosphere at Flohn's 
projected rates, the Arctic could be ice-free again. Its ice is now 
only two or three meters thick, which makes it sensitive to  changes 
in ocean heat flow. The Arctic ice could melt within a few decades 
or less. 
The eastern Antarctic continent has been fully glaciated for 
12- 14 million years, and it would probably stay that way with a 
global warming of 4 "C. This would increase the asymmetry of 
atmospheric-ocean circulation. Subtropical arid areas of the 
southern hemisphere would expand toward the equator, and the 
northern arid belt would extend to  the Mediterranean, affecting 
even southern central Europe. 
Temperature differences between the equator and the poles 
would decrease. Tropical and subtropical belts of the northern 
hemisphere would expand; temperate and subpolar belts would 
contract. After a possible series of catastrophic weather extremes, 
the earth's climatic zones would be displaced northward by 400- 
800 kilometers. 
In some areas man would benefit, but in others such a drastic 
climatic change coming abruptly in a few decades or  less would be 
highly destructive, drastically reducing freshwater supplies and 
causing unpredictable and potentially large agricultural losses. 
Flohn says the full effects are inconceivable, and the risks are 
unacceprable, and therefore man-made global warming must be 
prevented. 
Despite our highly advanced civilization, we still cannot pre- 
dict the climate in any dependable way. Progress is being made, 
however, and one day man may be able to  foresee potentially 
catastrophic changes in his biosystem. With this knowledge he 
may be able to avert such changes by adapting to them gradually 
or in some cases by preventing them. 
The main obstacle to gaining control over man's long-term 
climatic destiny is the sheer complexity of the total climatic 
system of the earth. Global climate consists of five subsystems 
that interact through a great variety of processes. 
The earth's most variable climatic subsystem is the atmos- 
phere, its gaseous envelope. Temperature changes are absorbed by 
the atmosphere in about a week. The hydrosphere - water on and 
under the earth - varies in its adjustment to  temperature changes. 
Upper layers of the ocean interact with the atmosphere in months 
to years; deep ocean waters take many centuries to make thermal 
adjustments. 
The cryosphere is snow and ice - continental ice sheets, 
mountain glaciers, snow cover, and ice on bodies of water. Much 
snow cover is seasonal, related to  atmospheric circulation. Glaciers 
and ice sheets have their own time scales, taking from hundreds to 
millions of  years to change significantly. 
The earth's surface land masses compose its lithosphere. This 
includes mountains, ocean basins, surface rock. soil, and sediments. 
Land takes the longest of any climatic subsystem to  change. For 
example, continental drift takes hundreds of millions of years. 
Such events are not strictly climatic, but they do  relate to glacia- 
tion. Also, the lithosphere affects climate as deep sea sediments 
accumulate, and more dramatically when volcanic debris is spread 
through the atmosphere. 
Plants and animals of land, sea, and air compose the biosphere. 
They influence climatic changes and are themselves sensitive to 
climatic changes. Changes in surface vegetation taking from decades 
t o  thousands of years affect surface albedo, evaporation, and 
ground hydrology. 
The climatic system can also be divided into an internal sys- 
tem of gas, liquid, and ice surrounding the earth and an external 
system of what lies under the surface of the earth and in the space 
surrounding it. Internal climatogenic processes include precipita- 
tion, evaporation, wind, and heat exchange between atmosphere, 
ocean, land, and ice. External processes include changes of solar 
radiation, earthquakes, volcanic explosions, changes of atmospheric 
composition, and changes in land and ocean shape. 
Some problems of prediction 
Internal climatogenic processes are caused by natural feed- 
back within the system. For instance, expansion of the Arctic 
sea ice is both cause and effect of climatic fluctuations. External 
processes, by contrast, start spontaneously, with no feedback 
triggering them. Volcanic eruptions can produce large numbers of 
particles in the submicron range that float in the stratosphere, 
where they will absorb and scatter some components of solar radia- 
tion. Great volcanic activity could result in cooling. 
The frequency of explosive volcanic eruptions varies greatly. 
They, like earthquakes, apparently result from the discontinuous 
motion of the tectonic plates of the earth's crust. There is at 
present no way to  predict volcanic activity, and no assurance that 
a cluster of heavy eruptions will not produce global cooling 
despite the warming effects of most of man's activities. 
A decrease in solar radiation could also cause global cooling, 
but there is limited and controversial evidence for such a process. 
The possibility of short-lived fluctuations of solar radiation in the 
visible and near-infrared part of the spectrum has been debated by 
specialists. A clearer picture awaits continuous high-precision 
measurement above the level of pollutants that exist in the dense 
layers of the atmosphere. Variations also occur in the sun's emis- 
sion of particles and its radiation in the far-ultraviolet (X-ray) 
range. 
Man's effects on climate are also elusive. It is generally agreed 
that so far they have been perceptible only locally. The role of 
Components of the climatic system 
Interaction of five physical components of the climatic system -atmosphere, 
hydrosphere, cryosphere, lithosphere, and biosphere. Black arrows indicate 
external processes, red arrows internal processes. Source: ~ational Academy 
of Sciences, US. 
atmospheric dust has sometimes been overrated, though it may be 
important in some deserts or semideserts (notably in Central Asia 
and the Middle East) and in large metropolitan areas. The effect 
of atmospheric dust depends on the size and quality of the par- 
ticles and on surface albedo. 
Great amounts of dust can have a warming rather than cool- 
ing effect, at least over continental areas. But there is an important 
difference. In contrast to the rather short residence time of tropo- 
spheric particles - days or weeks - the residence time of infrared- 
absorbing gases such as carbon dioxide is years and decades. 
At present, waste heat affects climate only locally, and it 
does not pose problems comparable with those of carbon dioxide. 
Even substantial increases in waste heat would pass through the 
atmosphere in mere hours or days and probably have no great 
influence on climate. 
By creating arable land and pastures, man destroys natural 
vegetation, causing soil erosion and desiccation of swamps, lakes, 
and marshes. Man also affects local climate with large-scale irriga- 
tion, reservoirs, and construction that seals thc earth's surface in 
concrete and other materials. These activities change surface albedo 
and roughness, soil moisture and evaporation, and infrared radia- 
tion from the earth. 
On a global scale, man's activities other than burning fossil 
fuels affect climate quite slowly. Nevertheless, continental surfaces 
have been subject to exponentially increasing changes at least 
since the Neolithic revolution about 8,000 years ago, when man 
began agriculture. Man-made microclimatic changes may be older; 
Paleolithic man used fire to  flush game. 
At least 30 percent of the continents are now affected by 
man's surface changes. According to  statistics from the Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the UN, destruction of natural vegeta- 
tion has reached an alarming rate. The figures indicate that tropical 
forests are being destroyed at an annual rate of 110,000 square 
kilometers. These forests are important to  the earth's carbon 
dioxide cycle, and their destruction increases surface albedo - one 
of the few man-made climatic processes that leads to  cooling, at 
"Despite our highly advanced civilization, we still cannot 
predict the climate in any dependable way." 
least where surface heating does not result from a reduction of 
evapotranspiration (loss of water from the soil both by evapora- 
tion and by transpiration from plants). 
Modeling versus paleoclimatic scenarios 
There are two basic ways of making predictions about climatic 
effects. One uses numerical models of the climate system, and the 
other uses observations of analogous occurrences in nature. In 
modeling, the processes of the climate system are expressed in a 
set of hydrodynamical and thermodynamical equations for the 
atmosphere, oceans, and ice, together with equations for selected 
constituents - carbon dioxide, water, ozone, and others. These 
equations describe the processes that determine distributions of 
temperature, pressure, density, and velocity. Other climatic 
processes - evaporation, condensation, precipitation, radiation - 
can also be described mathematically. 
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Devastating climatic variation. A better understanding of climate may help 
avert such events as the desertification of a large area of Senegal shown here. 
Rainfall in the Sahelian region of Africa began declining progressively in the 
early 1960s. Severe drought occurred from 1968 to  1974, at times affecting 
a belt stretching across Africa from the Atlantic to the Red Sea. Flocks and 
herds were wiped out over a wide area, and soil and woody vegetation have 
been severely damaged. In 1974 alone, an estimated 100,000-250,000 people 
died of famine in the Sahel, and the Ethiopian government estimated in 1978 
that 1.5 million people in the region faced the same fate. (Photo courtesy of 
International Communication Agency.) 
The equations describing the climatic system become the 
basis of climate modeling. Because our knowledge of the physical 
system is incomplete, physical and numerical approximations must 
be used to compensate for computational limitations. These 
approximations differ from model to  model in the hierarchy of 
climate models that has been created. 
Models capable of simulating some of the important climatic 
interactions are still lacking, so we cannot now predict climatic 
changes. And, external influences on the climatic system are 
likely to  remain unpredictable for some time, although conditional 
predictions may now be feasible. 
Conditional predictions assume that external climatogenlc 
effects, and perhaps some internal effects, will not change. For 
instance, we can model the implications of man-made changes in 
the composition of the atmosphere when all other factors remain 
constant. The model enables us to  improve our understanding of 
climatogenic processes despite its limitations in predicting the 
future. 
Given the limitations of modeling at present, a scenario 
based on historical and geological information is useful. It is 
essentially - but not exclusively - an empirical approach, and it 
too has serious limitations. One of the main problems is the dif- 
ference between past and present boundary conditions - place- 
ment of continents, glaciation, tree lines, desert areas, water levels, 
vegetation, and other topography. To speculate about increasing 
average annual temperatures, it is necessary t o  study climatic 
behavior over many epochs, which means dealing with a variety of 
boundary conditions. 
Time scale is a similar problem. The periods studied in the 
Flohn scenario cover more than 2 million years, while future cli- 
matic change is restricted to  the next 50-100 years. As a result, 
the implications of global warming relating to  the rate at which 
the warming takes place cannot be inferred from the scenario. 
External climatogenic processes and some internal processes 
as well must be assumed constant. The scenario assumes no major 
change in solar radiation, no unusual clustering of major volcanic 
eruptions, and no unusually large advance of the Antarctic ice 
shelves. Among internal processes, it assumes no significant varia- 
tion in average cloudiness. (The interaction of radiation and clouds 
is not well understood.) 
Compared with a model, the scenario discussed in this report 
has one advantage: it describes a situation that has occurred and 
therefore could occur again. To put it in modeling terms, a scenario 
based on history lets us see how nature has solved the complete 
set of equations simultaneously and on line, in all subsystems, in 
all scales, with a fully fourdimensional (time-dependent) approach. 
Since the earth's boundary conditions vary slowly but constantly, 
climatic history can never repeat itself in all details. But it can 
repeat itself in substance, and we can alert ourselves to  some of 
the possibilities. 

Man has made his appearance on earth at a time of unusual 
climatic conditions. Ice caps at the poles and extensive continental 
glaciation are known to  have existed during only one other epoch 
of the earth's history some 600 million years ago. Another period 
300 million years ago probably featured glaciation only around 
the South Pole. 
The earth was warmer until the end of the Mesozoic era 65 
million years earlier in its history. After some temperature ups and 
downs, a cooling trend set in roughly 55 million years back. About 
38 million years ago, glacial ice began appearing in the ocean around 
the Antarctic continent, and by 10 million years ago mountain 
glaciers had formed in the northern hemisphere. 
About 5 million years ago glaciation intensified. The Antarctic 
ice sheet, which had been expanding gradually, began rapid growth 
that for a time made it larger than it is today. Some three million 
years back ice sheets began to  form on the earth's northernmost 
lands. 
A central core of Arctic Ocean ice has existed for at  least the 
last 700,000 years and probably for more than 2 million years. 
Since ice caps became well established at both poles, they have 
expanded and contracted in a strikingly regular pattern. Over the 
last million years, northern hemisphere ice has peaked roughly 
every 100,000 years, and the western Antarctic ice sheet has 
generally kept pace. By contrast, ice sheet changes in the eastern 
Antarctic have been relatively minor, and they may not have 
coincided with northern hemisphere glaciations. 
The two most recent glacial periods came 160,000- 135,000 
years ago and 24,000-14,000 years ago. They were of similar 
intensity, and both ended abruptly in warm interglacial periods. 
The first of the two interglacials was warmest about 124,000 years 
ago. We are now in the second (the Holocene), which probably 
reached its thermal maximum about 6,000 years ago. 
It was generally warmer than today from 7,000 to 5,000 years 
ago, although colder intervals have been coming in many areas 
roughly every 2,500 years. The most recent of these chills peaked 
in the late 1700s, in a period of roughly 300-400 years known as 
the little ice age. 
In considering the effects global warming or global cooling 
might have on man in the present era, it is important to  note sea- 
sonal variations in ice cover. Also of great importance is the fact 
that marginal areas vary more than the central core of ice. In these 
areas cooling, in effect, breeds cooling. Snow and ice increase 
albedo, allowing less solar heat to penetrate the earth. This accounts 
for the fact that, when global warming or cooling takes place, 
temperature variations are greatest at the poles. 
At present, large oceanic areas of both poles are seasonally 
or permanently (in terms of seasons) covered by a thin blanket 
of ice floes separated by narrow strips of polynya (open water 
areas in sea ice). For most of the year these floes are covered by 
ice and snow with an albedo of almost 8 0  percent. But in summer, 
when the polar sun is still low in the sky, the albedo of open water 
in polar regions is 8- 12 percent. During the melting season - about 
ten weeks from mid-June to the end of August in the central 
Arctic - ponds of light blue meltwater decrease the albedo of the 
ice floes t o  about 60  percent. 
The importance of drift ice 
Ice about half a meter thick forms on the surface of the Arctic 
ocean. It drifts from the Arctic basin, pushed along by the strong 
east Greenland current and by a large anticyclonic gyre (circle) 
circling clockwise around the central core of ice between Greenland, 
Alaska, and Siberia. About one-third of this ice is seasonal, and 
the average life of one of its crystals is from five to ten years. 
While the central core of Arctic ice has been highly stable in 
historical times, its marginal parts have fluctuated greatly. After 
gradually receding to Greenland's north coast, ice floes began 
again to  advance along its eastern coast around 1320, sometimes 
blocking Iceland and the Denmark strait until late summer. 
During the late 17th and early 18th centuries, the ice advanced 
as far as Norway several times. It has been speculated that eskimos 
and polar bears stranded on a floe were occasionally carried as far 
Endangered species? Greenland icebergs such as this one drift to the New- 
foundland area of the Atlantic Ocean, where an unusually large number of 
them appeared from 1971 to 1973. Accordingto the Flohn scenario, however, 
global warming could cause them to disappear altogether. (Photo courtesy 
of International Communication Agency.) 
south as the coast of Scotland. The total area of Arctic ice may 
have varied by more than 20 percent during the last 1,000 years, 
and the southern edge of this ice shifted more than 2,000 kilometers 
in that length of time. 
Ice advanced on a large scale between 1550 and 1850, the 
little ice age period. At the same time, cyclones in the far south of 
the northern hemisphere tracked less to the north, as blocking 
anticyclones were more frequent above the colder surface waters 
of the Atlantic ocean north and west of the British Isles. In the 
northern hemisphere, cyclones rotate counterclockwise around 
low pressure centers; anticyclones go clockwise around high 
pressure centers. Cyclones are more violent, concentrating in a 
narrow path and often bringmg heavy rain. Anticyclones are 
usually diffused over a diameter of 1,500-3,000 kilometers. 
There were also frequent outbreaks of polar air across the 
Alps in eastern and central Europe during the little ice age, and an 
increase in cyclones in the Mediterranean area, which caused heavy 
rainfall. Cold air troughs frequently blew well into the tropics and 
produced anomalous amounts of rainfall. Today such troughs 
reach the tropics only rarely. Changes in albedo along the edges of 
the ice cover determine the formation of cold air, which in turn 
affects cold air currents and amounts of rainfall. 
A warm period occurred from 193 1 to 1960, and at that time 
polar ice shifts were rare. Since then ice in the northern hemisphere 
has advanced, which may partially account for some climatic 
abnormalities of recent years. For example: the severe winter of 
1967- 1968 in the USSR, the three severe winters of 1976- 1977 
to 1978-1979 in North America, an unbroken series of six unusu- 
ally mild winters (1 972-1 978) in Europe, and the coincidence of 
serious drought in eastern Europe and abundant rainfall in central 
Russia during the summer of 1976. 
Other weather anomalies of recent times include unusually 
large numbers of Greenland icebergs drifting to the Newfoundland 
area during the summers of 197 1 - 1973 and frequent heavy gales 
in the North Sea between 1972 and 1976. 
The physical reasons for climatic variation in the polar 
zones are not well understood. One possibility is that volcanic 
explosions trigger a series of events that lead to cooling. A large 
eruption, or a cluster of them, injects masses of minute particles 
into the stratosphere, where they converge over the interior of 
the Arctic and the Antarctic, forming a dust layer that lingers 
at an altitude of 10- 15 kilometers or more. At this level, exchange 
processes such as winds and convection currents are too weak to 
disperse the dust. 
By reflecting and absorbing solar radiation, the dust layer 
reduces surface temperatures of the earth and shortens the summer 
melting season. As a result, the average thickness of the ice may 
increase, which reduces heat flow between ocean and atmosphere. 
This may lead to more cooling and an extension of the ice. Albedo 
is increased during winter months, because thin seasonal ice grows 
faster than thick perennial floes. 
In contrast to the Arctic ice, the sub-Antarctic drift ice is 
about 85 percent seasonal. An extremely cold, thin surface layer 
develops about the Antarctic ice dome in winter, with average 
minimum temperatures below minus 7 0  " C .  The cold layer spreads 
outward, cools the sea surface, and produces an extended seasonal 
cover of drift ice about 1-1.5 meters thick. Extremely cold winds 
blow the ice out from the Antarctic. 
Two sharp tongues of sub-Antarctic drift ice and cold surface 
water reach the warmer water of the middle latitudes, one in the 
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"A central core of Arctic Ocean ice has existed for at least 
the last 700,000 years and probably for more than 2 million 
years." 
'The European revolutions of 1789 and 1848 occurred after 
a succession of years with bad weather, bad harvests, and 
high cereal prices. " 
Atlantic extending farther than its counterpart in the vast South 
Pacific. In the Arctic, by contrast, the climatic influence of drift 
ice is weakest in the Atlantic sector owing t o  the warm water of 
the Gulf Stream. Thus Bouvet Island (latitude 54  "S) is almost 
completely glaciated, yet Helgoland (latitude 54 ON) is a summer 
bathing resort. 
In addition to  an enormous area of sea ice (about 22 million 
square kilometers at the end of the southern winter), the Antarctic 
also produces large-scale tabular (flat) icebergs with an average 
depth of 200-400 meters. Occasionally they reach the size of the 
Netherlands - 30,000 square kilometers. They break off from the 
large Antarctic ice shelves and drift northward, with their last 
debris sometimes reaching as far as latitude 35 "S in the Atlantic. 
The Antarctic continental ice sheet 
An unorthodox ice-age hypothesis was proposed in 1964 by 
A.T. Wilson, a geochemist from New Zealand. He assumed that a 
combination of pressure from above and geothermal heat flow 
from below would cause a sufficiently thick body of ice to  melt 
at the bottom. This would make it possible for the Antarctic ice 
to move forward catastrophically on all sides, forming a quasi- 
permanent ice shelf of 20-30 million square kilometers. The result 
of such a gigantic ice slide would be a general cooling of the earth 
and the sudden spread of glaciation on the continents of the 
northern hemisphere. 
While the bulk of the eastern Antarctic ice is stable and well 
above sea level (except for a few small meltwater lakes), the smaller 
ice dome of western Antarctica rests on bedrock below sea level. 
Indeed this ice may not be stable. It has been suggested that it has 
disappeared in the geological past, and there is some risk that this 
could happen again in the foreseeable future. 
What small changes can mean 
Changes in the global average temperature that seem small to  
the general reader can utterly mislead him as to  their impacts. A 
temperature drop of 1 "C near the northern boundary of agricul- 
tural land (affecting, for instance, wheat in northern Canada or 
hay in Iceland), rather than having a trivial effect as one might 
naively expect, may reduce the growing season by several weeks, 
with detrimental effects on harvests. Even more essential are the 
accompanying changes in the frequencies of extremes in weather 
in lower and middle latitudes, causing long and cold springs, cool 
and wet summers, and so on. In recent history the most catastrophic 
years of sudden cooling were 13 16, 1430, 1570, and several years in 
the 1690s and 1780s (the latter group apparently affecting Europe, 
North America, and Japan). The European revolutions of 1789 and 
1848 occurred after a succession of years with bad weather, bad 
harvests, and high cereal prices; some of the most severe climatic 
conditions were reported in the years following some very heavy vol- 
canic eruptions. for example, after 1766, 1783, 181 5, and 1883. 
There is little doubt that the peaks of volcanic activity by 
and large coincide with series of particularly cool years (and espe- 
cially cool summers). The major volcanic eruption for which the 
best long-term documentation has been gathered occurred at 
Tambora in Indonesia in 18 15. It was followed by two catastrophic 
years in many areas of the world. In the eastern US, 18 16 was the 
"year without summer." During the same year central European 
cereal prices were the highest in centuries. The link between climate 
variations and changes in food availability, with concomitant pres- 
sures for migration, is readily apparent. 
Global atmospheric circulation is asymmetrical with respect 
to the equator, as is the wind-driven upper layer of the oceans. 
In equivalent seasons, the Antarctic troposphere averages about 
11 "C cooler than the Arctic. Stronger atmospheric circulation in 
the southern hemisphere crosses the equator and pushes the 
"meteorological equator" northward, so that it varies between 
latitudes of 0 and 15 O N ,  annually averaging 6 O N .  
Different heat and radiation budgets for the two hemispheres 
explain the asymmetry. The nearly landlocked Arctic ocean and 
its thin, perforated cover of drift ice contrasts with the isolated 
Antarctic continent covered by a sheet of ice more than two 
kilometers thick. The Antarctic has greater albedo and less cloudi- 
ness. 
Oddities of the equatorial belt 
Another important climatic variation at the equator is the 
irregular fluctuation of sea surface temperatures and of rainfall 
in a long, narrow belt across both the Pacific and the Atlantic, 
but not across the equatorial Indian Ocean. In a latitudinal belt 
between about 0 O and 4 "S, sea surface temperature drops in the 
Atlantic and Pacific from the average value for tropical oceans of 
26-27 "C, to  18-22 "C during the southern winter, and in some 
areas, such as the leeward side of islands, to below 15 "C. The 
occurrence of penguins at  the equatorial Galapagos Islands suggests 
both the extent of sea-surface temperature fluctuations and the 
possibilities of bioclimatic adaptation. 
The southeast trade winds cross the equator and reach latitude 
5-8 O N .  Passing the equator does not change their clockwise 
turning motion, so their flow is cyclonic in the southern hemi- 
sphere, but anticyclonic in the northern. While the southeast trades 
blow strong over ocean currents, upwelling of cold, deep water 
takes place just south of the equator and downwelling just north. 
At the same time, water temperature rises as ocean surface layers 
cross the equator from south to  north. 
The asymmetry of atmospheric and oceanic circulation is 
greatest during the season of northern summer and southern winter. 
Upwelling in the belt from 0 to  4 OS is greatest from June to 
September - when asymmetry is greatest and the southerly com- 
ponents of the trade winds predominate. 
Currently, equatorial upwelling is a normal feature of the 
air-sea system, but marked changes and even reversals of the pro- 
cess occur at irregular intervals, most commonly during the season 
of northern winter and southern summer. At such times the meteor- 
ological equator tends to be close t o  the actual equator at latitude 
0 O, because the southern wind and sea currents have weakened 
to  the strength of the northern currents. (The meteorological 
equator is generally referred to  as the intertropical convergence 
zone (ITCZ) to  distinguish it from a "front," which occurs between 
two wind systems of the same hemisphere and has quite different 
characteristics.) 
During one of these atypical periods, upwelling stops and 
downwelling occurs at the equator. This produces a sterile layer 
of warm water that drastically reduces the fish catch along the 
coasts of Ecuador and Peru. The period of anomalous seas usually 
appears around Christmas time, which accounts for the name by 
which it is generally known, El Niiio (The Christ child). 
Ocean surface currents 
A schematic representation of ocean surface currents from February through 
March. Source: Bryan, K. et a/. (1974) Global ocean-atmosphere climate 
model, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ. 
Winds and ocean currents are extremely variable. The monthly 
average intensity of the large zonal ocean currents varies over a 
year by plus or  minus 50 percent. Major ocean wind currents vary 
over a year between plus 44 percent and minus 25 percent when 
similarly measured, with rates for individual months varying from 
the average by as much as plus 100 percent and minus 52 percent. 
Upwelling coincides with high zonal winds (the trades), and 
downwelling takes place when these winds weaken on both sides 
of the equator. The vertical circulation of the ocean at the equator 
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"The occurrence of penguins at the equatorial Galapagos 
Islands suggests both the extent of sea-surface temperature 
fluctuations and the possibilities of bioclimatic adaptation." 
"The monthly average intensity of the large zonal ocean 
currents varies over a year by plus or minus 50 percent." 
then reverses. Upwelling becomes downwelling, producing the 
El Niiio phenomenon over a wide area between 80  OW and 160 "E, 
a distance of about 13,000 kilometers. 
El NiEo is accompanied by torrential rainfall, by thermo- 
dynamic instability (as the temperature of the water becomes 
greater than the temperature of the air), and by falling relative 
humidity that increases evaporation. Rainfall variations in the 
area are greater than anywhere else on earth. For instance, at 
Nauru (latitude 0.5 "S, longitude 169 OE) the rainfall during two 
nearly consecutive 12-month periods between 19 16 and 19 18 
varied between 95 and 5,000 millimeters. 
Winds and oceans in the past 
During past epochs, conditions have sometimes been quite 
different. At times equatorial upwelling, with rainfall and evapora- 
tion at a minimum, has taken place because of strong atmospheric 
circulation from the southern hemisphere. At other times weak 
circulation from the southern hemisphere has made downwelling 
at the equator the rule rather than the exception, so that the 
equatorial belt was typically an area of high rainfall and rapid 
evaporation. 
During past glacial epochs, strong zonal circulation and equa- 
torial upwelling may have taken place from 90  to  100 percent of 
the time. Some interglacial epochs probably had equatorial down- 
welling nearly all of the time. There is evidence that water tem- 
perature fluctuations were greater in the past. In glacial times, a 
permanent southerly air flow probably increased upwelling and 
spread cool water to greater distances on both sides of the equator. 
When water temperatures are less than air temperatures, 
thermal stability increases and evaporation decreases. In glacial 
times evaporation may have reversed to  condensation, producing 
dew on the cool surface of the equatorial waters. During inter- 
The variability of rainfall 
Rainfall variability 
The figures denote percentage departures from normal. 
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In some areas, rainfall can vary 30 percent or more from one year to the 
next, causing serious problems of crop failures. Source: Petterssen, S. 
(1969) Introduction to Meteorology, McGraw-Hill, New York. 
glacial periods, when circulation was distinctly weaker, tropical 
warm water at temperatures of 26-27 O C  may have produced high 
instability, evaporation, and torrential rains more than 90 percent 
of the time. 
In considering the effects of global warming and cooling, it 
is important to note that relatively weak variations in atmospheric 
circulatix can lead to  enormous variations in evaporation and 
rainfall. A comparison of two past epochs illustrates the point. 
During the last glacial period, about 24,000-14,000 years ago, it 
was considerably more arid almost everywhere than it is today. 
However, the last interglacial period, about 124,000 years ago, 
was a lot more humid than today. It is possible that the tempera- 
ture fluctuations involved in these major climatic differences took 
place for the most part within an equatorial ocean belt of the 
Pacific and the Atlantic between latitudes 10 "S and 10 O N .  
Recent investigations based on a great number of ocean core 
samples indicate that at the peak of the last glaciation, 18,000 
years ago, water temperature at one location on the equator was 
16 "C in August - about 7-8 "C colder than it is currently at the 
same time of year. At the peak of the last interglacial period, 
124,000 years ago, the equatorial water temperature was approx- 
imately 26 "C. In subtropical latitudes, water temperature has 
remained essentially unchanged from the last interglacial period 
until the present. 
February equatorial temperatures, by contrast, were only 
1-3 "C colder 18,000 years ago than they are today. This indicates 
a strong upwelling during southern winter and the extension of 
southerly circulation beyond the equator into the northern hemi- 
sphere. The vigorous circulation resulted from expansion of sub- 
Antarctic seasonal ice. 

As the foregoing chapters suggest, natural climatic variations 
are far greater than any man may have caused until now. Also, 
future natural changes could effectively counteract man's influence 
over climate. Nevertheless, man's effects on climate are growing, 
and it is possible that man-made global warming will have significant 
effect on the climate of the earth within the coming century. 
The IIASA Energy Program has published information on the 
amount of heat released into the atmosphere by present-day human 
activities. It estimates that about 8 terawatts of energy are now 
being generated by man (one terawatt is one trillion, 1 012, watts). 
This amount of heat is small compared with the solar energy received 
by the earth, an estimated 80,000 terawatts. Man's heat may affect 
climate in some local areas, but since it is unlikely to  have global 
effect, Flohn has not  included it in his study. 
The c ~ m b i n e d  greenhouse effect 
Man-made global warming, if indeed it soon begins to occur, 
will not be caused by carbon dioxide alone, but this one chemical 
is clearly the villain of the story. It is one of the products of the 
combustion of fossil (carbon) fuels - coal, petroleum, and natural 
gas - and its content in the atmosphere has probably been increasing 
exponentially since industrial production reached large-scale pro- 
portions in Europe and North America in the 19th century. 
Currently more than 5 billion (1 O9 ) tons of carbon are released 
into the earth's atmosphere every year. The global atmosphere 
now contains more than 700 billion tons of carbon, which is an 
increase of aboiit 6 percent in the last 25 years. 
If the rate of carbon dioxide release continues, and many 
experts feel that it will not only continue but accelerate, it is likely 
that the earth will start getting warmer. Carbon dioxide in the 
atmosphere is transparent to most of the solar energy reaching it, 
but it is not transparent to  the energy re-radiated by the earth. 
Energy in the infrared range - heat - that once bounced back out 
to space becomes trapped between the carbon-dioxide-laden atmos- 
phere and the earth. This produces what is called a greenhouse 
effect by warming the earth's surface and the lower layers of its 
atmosphere. 
Determining the extent of the global warming that results 
from adding more carbon dioxide to the atmosphere is no easy 
matter. For one thing, water vapor, which is the strongest absorber 
of infrared radiation in the atmosphere, is also involved in man- 
made global warming. 
Whenever air temperature rises, water vapor plays an important 
and complex role. A warmer atmosphere would cause the evapora- 
tion of the oceans t o  increase appreciably because of higher tem- 
peratures of both air and water. This increase of water vapor in the 
atmosphere could contribute to  heating. Rising temperatures would 
also weaken southern hemisphere wind and sea currents, increasing 
periods of downwelling in the equatorial belt. As noted in the pre- 
vious chapter, this condition increases evaporation significantly. 
But water vapor also illustrates the compensating chaliges in 
climate that sometimes occur. More water vapor in the atmosphere 
produces clouds that can reduce the amount of solar radiation 
reaching the earth. But cloud cover changes rapidly, and the ex- 
tent to which it can offset global warming is difficult to determine. 
There are other factors that must be considered in estimating 
the effects of releasing more carbon dioxide into the atmosphere: 
the natural formation of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere; the 
absorption rate of the gas and particles released along with it;  the 
degree of concentration of these materials at the poles where tem- 
perature variations are more pronounced; "feedback" effects such 
as changes these materials cause in cloud structure and distribu- 
tion; and the role of other trace gases released into the atmosphere 
by man. 
Other trace gases may add to man-made global warming. 
These gases - primarily nitrous oxide, methane, ammonia, and the 
freons - absorb terrestrial radiation just as carbon dioxide does. 
Release of these trace gases is not expected to rival carbon dioxide 
in quantity, but their effect when combined with the effect of car- 
bon dioxide is considerable. 
"Currently more than 5 billion (lo9 ) tons of carbonare 
released into the earth's atmosphere every year." 
Nitrous oxide is produced by denitrification of fertilizers in 
the soil and by aircraft emissions. Large quantities of it are re- 
leased into the atmosphere, and these amounts are likely to be 
maintained or increased in the years just ahead. It also has a long 
residence time in the atmosphere, probably about 70 years. 
Methane, like carbon dioxide, is released into the atmosphere 
when fossil fuels are burned, and the amount of this gas released 
is likely to  be significant in the future. Ammonia is also released 
by fertilizers in significant amounts that could increase in the 
future. Chlorofluoromethanes may be released in diminishing 
quantities as gas-propelled spray cans are used less, but these gases 
will continue to contribute to global warming a t  least in the near 
future because they also have long residence times in the atmo- 
sphere, about 30-50 years. The greenhouse effect of all other gases 
is small compared with the ones mentioned here. 
Scientists have attempted to  estimate the combined effects 
of carbon dioxide and all other significant trace gases using com- 
prehensive models of atmospheric changes. One difficulty has been 
in taking account of the role of clouds. Although cloud-radiation 
feedback is not fully understood, the lack of knowledge does not 
prevent scientists from making useful estimates of global warming. 
Flohn bases his estimate on two well-regarded models of the atmo- 
sphere that have reached similar conclusions by dissimilar means 
and on other scientific studies of trace gases in the atmosphere. 
He assumes that other trace gases increase the greenhouse effect of 
carbon dioxide by roughly 5Wo. 
A timetable for global warming 
The amounts by which atmospheric carbon dioxide and other 
gases increase in the atmosphere depend importantly on man's fossil 
fuel consumption rate in the years ahead, the use of chemical fer- 
tilizers, and the use of chlorofluoromethanes. This relates to  matters 
of public policy, economic growth, and consumption patterns that 
are not dealt with in the Flohn research report. Flohn notes that 
at the IIASA workshop in 1978 (Jill Williams, editor, Carbon 
Dioxide, Climate and Society, Pergamon Press, Oxford, 1978) 
participating specialists tentatively concluded that there would be 
Carbon dioxide on the increase. The burning of fossil fuels in all regions of 
the world adds carbon dioxide to the atmosphere. Here a Moscow power 
station contributes to global warming. (Photo courtesy of United Nations1 
P. Teuscher.) 
a "manifold increase" in atmospheric carbon dioxide if all eco- 
nomically exploitable fossil fuels were burned, and if the growth 
rate of fossil fuel (carbon) combustion could not be reduced to  
less than 3 percent a year. 
One survey has estimated that atmospheric carbon dioxide 
will double around 2040 and increase by a factor of from three 
to five (or even more) by the 22nd century. But such predictions 
are controversial. For one reason, the role of forest cover is not well 
understood. Forests, like oceans, are a "sink" for carbon - they 
absorb and store it. Harvesting forests and transforming them 
into other types of vegetation that store much less carbon re- 
leases carbon dioxide into the atmosphere. According to  the 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN, virgin forests are 
now being destroyed at the rate of 110,000 square kilometers a 
year. Deforestation at such rates may make the earth's vegetation 
a net source of increased atmospheric carbon dioxide. 
Using some of the most reliable recent projections of atmo- 
spheric carbon dioxide growth, Flohn has devised a global warming 
timetable that assumes that other trace gases will add 50% to  the 
greenhouse effect. The timetable also assumes that fossil fuel 
combustion will continue to increase at  the current rate for the 
next 100 years. He calculates an increase in fossil fuel combustion 
of 3.5-4 percent per year. This is a conservative rate; some recent 
studies report that fossil fuel combustion is now increasing at 4.3 
percent per year. 
According to the Flohn timetable, global warming of 0.4- 
0.5 "C could occur between 1990 and 2000. Global warming of 
1 "C would then take place early in the 21st century, producing 
global temperatures similar to those existing about 1,000 years 
ago, during the early Middle Ages. 
Global warming could reach 1.5 "C between 2005 and 2030, 
which would produce temperatures corresponding to those at the 
peak of the Holocene warming period about 6,000 years ago. 
Global warming would reach 2.5 "C between 2020 and 2050, 
when temperatures would be about the same as during the last 
interglacial period, which occurred 120,000 years ago. Global 
warming of 4 "C could also be reached by 2050 or soon after, and 
this would produce conditions similar to those of a long period 
from about 12 million to  2.5 million years ago, just before the cur- 
rent series of glacial and interglacial periods began. 

To gain insights into climatic changes possible with warming, 
whether by modeling the future o r  by paleoclimatic reference to  
the past, temperatures must first be determined in some useful way. 
This has proved to  be one of the most difficult problems in deal- 
ing with global cooling and warming. 
Flohn has taken global average surface temperature estimates 
as being representative. He has compared global average models 
that compute the change of temperature for a given increase in 
carbon dioxide. He has then adjusted the figures to account for 
other trace gases. This provides a useful calculation, despite the 
uncertainties briefly outlined in earlier chapters of this report, the 
most significant of them being the lack of knowledge of the 
climate's feedback systems. 
Making do with global averages 
But there are other serious limitations to  working with changes 
in global average surface temperatures, and the reader should keep 
them in mind. For one thing, regional climatic changes do  not 
always correspond to  global climatic changes. A significant change 
in global average surface temperature could result in large changes 
in only a few regions. There might be minor changes in other 
areas. Or, climate could change drastically over large regions with- 
out making any substantial change in globally averaged temperature. 
A current estimate of global average surface temperature 
widely cited is 15 "C,  a very rough figure at best. It is simply not 
possible to determine such a figure and its recent changes precisely 
with the meteorological network available today. Many large areas 
of the earth are not represented in this network. 
Ocean surface temperatures 
The annual average ocean surface temperature in degrees centigrade, based 
on US Navy Hydrographic Office data. Source: Bryan, K., et a/. (1974) 
Global ocean-atmosphere climate model, Princeton University, Princetm, 
NJ. 
Short-lived fluctuations in weather present another, com- 
pletely different problem. These changes are unpredictable over 
the long time scales needed to  determine climatic change. Such 
short-term fluctuations are called "climatic noise." 
At present, global or hemispheric variations in surface tem- 
perature are detected primarily with the help of climate stations 
on the continents and on a number of islands. There are many 
gaps in the coverage, especially in oceanic regions, where the small 
number of stationary weather ships has been reduced drastically 
since 1973. Generally, the northern hemisphere is represented far 
better in the network than the southern. 
More stations reporting would serve t o  smooth out temporary 
irregularities in climate data that occur over months, seasons, and 
years. Because of the inadequacy of the worldwide station net- 
work, hemispheric temperature variations of 0.2-0.3 "C can hardly 
be distinguished from climatic noise. 
Another reason why global average temperature figures are 
difficult to  determine and t~ use is that climatic changes are always 
subject to  major longitudinal variations over a given latitude. For 
example, trends in the Asiatic and the American sectors of the 
Arctic region are often just the opposite, with one area cooling 
while the other w m s .  A similar alteration occurs in what is called 
the Greenland-Northwestern Europe seesaw, with temperatures 
rising in one place while falling in the other until the process 
reverses. This phenomenon has been observed for more than two 
centuries. 
Recent climatic changes 
Various scientific papers prepared within the last few years 
provide an overview of the most recent temperature fluctuations. 
The most striking variations from 1950 to  the present have occurred 
primarily in the latitude belt 60-85 ON, a band that takes in Alaska, 
Greenland, and other northern land bordering on the Arctic Ocean. 
As we would expect from the action of albedo and other factors 
relating t o  the formation of snow and ice, interannual temperature 
fluctuations have been greatest in subarctic and arctic latitudes. 
For example, from 1940 to  1975, temperature changes from year 
"Climate could change drastically over a large region with- 
out making any substantial change in globally averaged 
temperature." 
to  year averaged 0.5 OC in a belt from 57.5 ON to  72.5 ON, and in 
the polar belt from 72.5 ON to  87.5 "N they averaged 0.63 "C. 
The average temperature in the northern hemisphere increased 
from 1890 to  1940 by about 0.6 "C, then decreased until 1975 by 
about 0.3 "C. Since then it has been rising slightly, at least at the 
polar cap. The absence of major volcanic eruptions during a period 
of several decades may be one of the reasons for the warming pe- 
riod that extended roughly to  1940. 
In the high (poleward) latitudes of the southern hemisphere, 
weak warming has been going on since 1943. Most of the inter- 
annual fluctuations in climate since then have been short-lived 
throughout the southern hemisphere and especially at the equa- 
torial belt. The long-term trend has been warming at about 0.0 l - 
0.02 "C a year for the southern hemisphere as a whole. 
From 1940 until now, the northern hemisphere has cooled 
about 0.3-0.4 "C. There are signs that the cooling has passed its 
climax. Since 1974 the north polar region has not been as ex- 
tremely cold as it was between 1964 and 1972, a time when the 
The limits of observations 
In order to  discuss the effects of changing the atmospheric CO, 
[carbon dioxide] concentration using observations or  modeling, 
the simplest approach is to  define climate as the global average 
surface temperature. A global average (or one-dimensional) 
model can be used t o  compute the change of "climate" for a 
change in atmospheric CO, concentration and we are presently 
able to make calculations of this kind although our lack of 
knowledge of feedbacks means that there are uncertainties in the 
results. With regard to  observations, recent studies have shown 
that not only the amplitude but also the direction of global 
trends in surface temperature during the last 100 years are 
uncertain. 
- Jill Williams, In froduction to the Climate/ 
Environment Aspects o f  CO, (A Pessimis- 
tic View). In Jill Williams, editor, Carbon 
Dioxide, Climate and Society, Pergamon 
Press, Oxford, 1978. 
Arctic ice was progressing toward Iceland and Newfoundland. The 
sniall changes in temperatures of the low latitudes suggest that 
the cooling of the Arctic from 1940 until 1972 was not a global 
phenomenon. 
If future man-made warming is superimposed on the natural 
fluctuations that have occurred in irregular intervals over several 
decades, it can be expected to intensify the natural warming epi- 
sodes and weaken - or even reverse - the natural cooling episodes. 
A warming of about 0.5 O C  above the noise level maintained for 
about ten years would very likely have such an effect. 
Consequently, a global warming of 0.5 "C provides a reason- 
able threshold for a general perception of warming - even though 
it still may be impossible to  determine how much of the resulting 
climatic change is natural and how much is caused by man. 
If man keeps releasing carbon dioxide, nitrous oxide, and 
other heat-absorbing gases into the atmosphere at current rates 
and no natural changes occur, the global average surface tempera- 
ture will rise about 0.5 "C by 1990-2000, Flohn estimates. This 
would likely produce some of the climatic patterns of the period 
from 191 6 to  1950, which was one of the warmest times of the 
last 500 years. 
However, major climatic changes affecting man in significant 
ways would probably await a period of further global warming. 
By 2000-20 10, a rise of 1 "C from the present global average could 
be reached, and this could begin to  have economic and social con- 
sequences directly attributable to  man-made global warming. 
Global warming of 1 "C would correspond to  the global 
average surface temperature of the early Middle Ages, which was 
the warmest period of the last millennium. The time when highest 
temperatures were reached varies by area, but the greatest varia- 
tion from present climatic conditions was probably during a period 
between 900 and 1050. 
This period saw warm conditions in the Arctic latitudes, with 
no sea ice in the east Greenland current. In Iceland and Norway, 
cereal was cultivated up to  65 ON, and there were settlements as 
far north as Ellesmere Island and the New Siberian Islands. 
In Canada, forests advanced 100 kilometers north of their 
present limits. Forests also ranged to  higher latitudes in Europe, 
and vegetation zones shifted upward in European mountains. 
Frequent droughts occurred in all parts of Europe south of 60 ON. 
The Caspian Sea was 2-3 meters lower than today (even though 
much of its water is removed today for irrigation). The Dead Sea 
was nearly as low as it is now. 
Some parts of the Sahara were apparently wetter in the early 
Middle Ages than they are today. Horse caravans crossed the north- 
ern Sahara, and the Kufra oasis, which is now near the center of 
the desert, was an area of cattle raising. China and Japan had warm 
summers, but severe winters were also recorded in China during 
the period. 
Paleoclimatic evidence is somewhat scanty for North America 
during this period. However, tree-ring data from the mountains of 
California suggest higher temperatures and less rainfall in the area, 
conditions that also existed in southwestern Colorado. 
While evidence from the tropics is also thin for the early 
Middle Ages, it appears that Cambodia and the Yucatan peninsula, 
areas of tropical latitude on opposite sides of the earth, both 
flourished under conditions somewhat drier than those of today. 
In Africa, there were heavy rains in southern Ethiopia, Nile floods 
were low, and Lake Turkana was high. On the Antarctic coast 
there are indications that a long period of warming existed, and in 
New Zealand there was a period of severe drought and forest fires. 
These conditions have been interpreted to  suggest that the 
cyclone track was shifted northward by 3-5 ",  so that it reached 
60-65 ON, or  well into northern Europe. The prevailing high pres- 
sure conditions over Europe would thus have produced conditions 
similar to  the warmest and driest summers of the period from 193 1 
to  1960. 
Clearly, if 900-1050 can indeed be taken as a hint of 2000- 
2010, an increase of 1 "C in the'global average surface temperature 
caused by man would be a serious matter. Higher tracking cyclones 
would mean extended droughts in summer and blizzards in winter, 
conditions that were especially prevalent in eastern Europe during 
the early Middle Ages. The pattern is consistent with the marked 
retreat of Arctic sea ice during the period. Sea ice withdrew from 
most of the sea around Greenland; Atlantic sea ice retreated north 
of latitude 80  ON, which made nearly all northern coasts ice free. 
Since feedback processes and other factors that lead to  a 
reversal of the global temperature trend are not fully understood, 
it is important to consider what came directly after the period in 
question. Cooling in northern Greenland after 1 160 has been iden- 
tified. This coincides with a marked advance of glaciers in the Alps 
and other mountain ranges, and with the reappearance of Arctic 
sea ice around northern land masses at roughly 1320. At this time 
extreme climatic anomalies and severe famines began to occur 
throughout Europe. In the Iowa and Illinois areas of North America, 
a drought period of 200 years resulted in mass migrations. After 
some fluctuations, these events led to  the little ice age (1 550- 
1850). 
Global temperatures 1 OC higher than those of today could 
be a costly development for man. The problems of maintaining 
agricultural production during extended drought could be enor- 
mous at levels of world population projected for the beginning of 
the 21st century. Serious shortages of freshwater supply could 
affect many countries in the subtropical belt of winter rains, such 
as California, Spain, and the Near and Middle East. Severe winters 
could occur in the temperate zone, which includes most of the 
highly industrialized areas of the northern hemisphere. 
The severe weather conditions imposed by a 1 OC increase in 
global warming could begin within the next two decades. A person 
now 20 years old might see food shortages and population migra- 
tions in areas of high living standards before reaching mid-career. 
Economic setbacks in developing countries could have catastrophic 
results as competition for the world's food resources intensified. 
It is possible, in fact, that the most severe consequences of 
man-made global warming lie immediately ahead. Further warming 
- to a 1.5 OC increase - could produce entirely different climatic 
conditions that might to  some extent be more favorable to  man, 
as the next part of Flohn's paleoclimatic scenario suggests. 
The Holocene heat 
If man continues contributing to the greenhouse effect at the 
rates Flohn assumes, global warming would reach 1.5 "C sometime 
between 2005 and 2030, which would correspond t o  temperatures 
at the peak of the Holocene warming period some 6,000 years ago. 
For many peoples of the earth, a climatic throwback to  something 
like the conditions of that time might actually produce a more 
favorable epoch, at least in terms of the weather. 
The ice domes of North America and northern Europe re- 
treated after the peak of the last ice age around 18,000 years ago. 
While the smaller Scandinavian ice sheet finally disappeared some 
8,000 years ago, the North American ice sheet at that time had only 
retreated to  about half of its former area. Then came an incursion 
of the sea into Hudson Bay roughly 7,800-7,600 years ago, and 
after that separate ice sheets remained - a Labrador sheet that 
disappeared by 4,500 years ago, and Baffin Island ice that remains 
today. 
The retreat of the Arctic ice created a marked longitudinal 
asymmetry of the atmospheric circulation between 8,000 and 
6,500 years ago. By 4,500 years ago it had faded out. At the 
Holocene peak around 6,000 years ago, Eurasia and Africa experi- 
enced the warmest epoch of the last 75,000 years, while eastern 
North America remained relatively cool, especially in summer 
when the heat was relieved by frequent outbreaks of cooling polar 
air. 










1 Poor soy bean crop 
2 Failure of anchovy fisheries 
3 Drought - Sahelian zone 
4 Heavy pack ice 
5 Sharp reduction in wheat crop 
6 Monsoonal failure 
7 Poor rice crop 
The year 1972 featured downwelling at the equatorial belt and other climatic 
anomalies that had harsh repercussions for man. Anchovy fisheries failed 
along the coasts of Equador and Peru, a severe drought in the Sahel region of 
Africa (beginning in 1968) decimated herds of cattle, North American soy 
bean crops were poor, and wheat crops of the USSR also failed. It i s  im- 
portant to learn whether or not man-induced climatic changes will bring 
such unfavorable conditions permanently. Source: Daniel, H. (1980) Man 
and Climatic Variability, World Meteorological Organization, Geneva. 
Note that ii. describing events at the warmest time of the 
Holocene period, approximate dates are given in radiocarbon years, 
which are determined by establishing the half-life of radioactive 
carbon particles, such as carbon 14. Conversion of these dates into 
calendar years, with possible differences of up to 12 percent, is a 
matter of controversy among scientists. The data available cannot 
be determined to  within 100 years, or even 500 years. 
Winds over the Atlantic were predominately southwesterly, 
which probably intensified the Gulf Stream and its northward- 
flowing branches at the peak of the Holocene. In winter, anticyclon- 
ic ridges occurred frequently in the Atlantic, suggesting that out- 
breaks of polar air were also common over central and eastern 
Europe and extending - with copious rainfall - to  the Mediterra- 
nean Sea and northern Africa. 
At the same time, forests in western Canada and in western 
Siberia extended 200-300 kilometers farther north than they do 
today. Summer temperatures in these areas were probably 2-3 "C 
higher than they are now. Subarctic forests covered the northern- 
most islands of Norway and the entire Taimyr peninsula of the far 
northern USSR. 
The warming ended rather abruptly, which is not uncommon. 
A polar outbreak lasting no longer than 200 years shifted the 
Canadian timberline more than 300 kilometers south. At roughly 
the same time, shifts toward a neoglacial climate were taking place 
in many areas, with general conditions similar t o  those in the little 
ice age. As this cooling developed, deserts gradually expanded. 
While the peak of the Holocene warming appears to have come 
about 6,000 years ago, there was variation by area. The interior of 
the Arctic Ocean was not at its warmest until later, about 4,500 
years ago. At that time, open waters flowed in the fjords and along 
the northern coasts of Spitzbergen, Greenland, and Ellesmere 
Island. Siberian driftwood reached these coasts as far north as 
latitude 83  O N .  There is no indication, however, that the core of 
the present Arctic drift ice between Greenland, Alaska, and eastern 
Siberia disappeared at any time from the Holocene to  the present. 
In subantarctic seas, drift ice shrank faster than in the Arctic, 
which led to a warming peak as early as 9,000 years ago. The 
warming also peaked early in eastern Siberia where no major ice 
sheets had formed during the previous glaciation. Warming there 
was well started by 7,000 years ago and, at Lake Biwa in central 
Japan, by 8,000 years ago. 
As temperatures rose from the previous glaciation period to  
the peak of the Holocene warming, a series of abrupt fluctuations 
between cooling and warming took place between about 13,500 
and 10,800 years ago. Toward the end of this period global tem- 
peratures similar to those existing today occurred, and tropical 
oceans became slightly warmer than they are now, a condition 
that probably weakened tropical circulation substantially. 
Increased evaporation would have raised the water vapor 
content of the tropical air, leading to  a rapid expansion of tropical 
rainbelt and rain forests into higher latitudes. During the previous 
ice age these forests had been reduced drastically. 
As is to  be expected, the amount of warming during the 
Holocene period also varied by area. The waters of the Kuroshio 
Sea between Japan and Taiwan were as much as 6 "C warmer than 
they are now. On mid-latitude ocean coasts, temperatures were 
probably 1.5-2 "C above current amounts. In northeastern North 
America, and probably in other inland continental areas, tempera- 
tures were not as high. A prairie extending into the present states 
of Wisconsin and Illinois in the US, some areas in southwest 
Siberia, and an area in eastern Turkey were all drier during the 
Holocene than now. Yet there is evidence that some northern 
European and Asiatic forests had somewhat higher temperatures 
and rainfall than at present. 
In eastern Siberia, the southern boundary of permafrost was 
several hundred kilometers north of its present position, and a 
similar retreat can be assumed for Canada and Alaska because of 
the northward extension of vegetation lines. In the mountains 
of these northern regions, tree lines shifted northward by 100- 
150 kilometers, which indicates warming of nearly 1 OC. 
The Holocene humidity 
Global warming of 1.5 "C would correspond roughly to the 
peak of the Holocene warming some 6,000 years ago. While warm- 
ing of up to  1 OC or so would produce drier conditions in many 
temperate areas, further warming up to  1.5 OC might result in 
more humid conditions in some subtropical areas that are dry 
today, as well as generally drier conditions elsewhere. 
In subtropical latitudes, the present arid areas were wetter 
during the Holocene. Since temperatures everywhere were either 
higher or similar to  those of today, the humidity must have been 
related to greater rainfall, caused in turn by greater evaporation 
of the tropical oceans. This probably coincided with a weakening 
of the subtropical anticyclones and trade winds (see Chapter 4). 
Perhaps the most dramatic example of the Holocene's greater 
humidity occurred in the Sahara desert and the deserts of the 
Middle East. Remnants of the North American ice and frequent 
outbreaks of cold air over Europe and Africa between 8,400 and 
5,900 years ago may have c a ~ s e d  Mediterranean winter rains to 
reach the north flank of the Sahara. At the same time, tropical 
rains could have penetrated into the south flank, as happened 
previously, so that both flanks of the desert shrank and expanded 
together. The central belt of the Sahara also experienced some 
amount of rain during the period. 
Among now-dry Sahara lakes that then had water is Lake 
MegaChad, which at 320,000 square kilometers was about the size 
of the presentday Caspian Sea. At times it overflowed into the 
Benue-Niger catchment. Even in what is now the hyper-arid center 
"Clearly, an increase of 1 "C in the global average surface 
temperature caused by man would be a serious matter." 
"A person now 20 years old might see food shortages and 
population migrations in areas of high living standards before 
reaching mid-career." 
of the Sahara between the Kufra Oasis and the Tibesti MounJains 
(now with less than five millimeters of rain per year), permanent 
or periodic rivers were flowing, indicating at least 250 millimeters 
of rain per year, and possibly as much as 400 millimeters. Grass- 
lands in this area were used for raising cattle by many groups of 
nomads. 
Similar evidence has been found all across the arid belt that 
runs from Mauretania in western Africa to  Rajasthan in India, 
which includes the Afar-Danakil depression and the Arabian 
interior. At the margin of the Tharr desert in India, which now has 
an average annual rainfall of about 250 millimeters, rain fell at a 
rate of 500-800 millimeters a year during a long moist period 
between roughly 10,500 years ago and 3,600 years ago. Evidence 
from more than 30  locations in the whole area suggests that both 
extratropical winter rains and monsoonal summer rains increased 
substantially and simultaneously. 
Desiccation set in throughout the region around 5,500 years 
ago. The gradual drying was interrupted by wetter periods. Several 
of the early high civilizations - the old empire of Egypt from the 
first to  the fourth dynasties, the urban cultures of the Near East 
between Jericho and Ur, and the Indus culture - began at the end 
of the humid period and had to  struggle against increasing dryness. 
Evidence of climatic conditions in the arid southwest of the 
US during the Holocene is limited. A freshwater lake is known to  
have existed in central New Mexico, indicating greater moistness. 
In California and Nevada, lake levels were high between about 
13,000 years ago and 10,000 years ago, and this moist period was 
followed by a marked dry period lasting until about 5,000 years 
ago. 
Deserts in the southern hemisphere generally appear to  have 
followed the pattern in the north. In Australia, precipitation 
increased at  northern and southern margins of the desert areas at 
the peak of the Holocene, and slight warming occurred in the moun- 
tains of New Guinea. Evidence from South Africa, however, does 
not conform to  the pattern. There the interior plateau had warmer, 
but drier semidesert conditions during the period. 
The effect of boundary conditions 
As noted, boundary conditions (such as ice sheet size, vegeta- 
tion lines, and tide levels) were not  the same 6,000 years ago as 
they are now. There were two main differences: ice sheets in the 
A case of desertification 
The desertification process associated with the Sahelian drought 
also poses a serious threat to  many other arid and semi-arid coun- 
tries. This threat prompted the United Nations Conference on 
Desertification in Nairobi in 1977. The conference considered that 
the drought of 1968 to 1973 was the culmination of a desiccation 
dating back to  the late 1950s or early 1960s in most parts of the 
Sahel. It was not unprecedented, though it was prolonged, severe 
and widespread. Records exist of similar droughts 30 ,50 ,  and 60 
years earlier. The desertification that accompanies the drought, 
that is, the spread of nonproductive land conditions, had two 
causes: heavy stocking of animals and continued dry land cultiva- 
tion, until the land could no longer sustain the human and animal 
populations during the drought years. 
- Howard Daniel, Man and Climatic Varia- 
bility, World Meteorological Organization, 
Geneva, 1980. 
northern hemisphere still remained in eastern Canada (though they 
had retreated from other major land masses), and there were no 
significant desertification processes resulting from the activities 
of man. 
The ice in eastern Canada probably disappeared during the 
period of dryness that began soon after the peak of the Holocene. 
While it existed, however, it was a permanent cold source that no 
doubt influenced circulation patterns in Europe, producing frequent 
blocking anticyclones around the British Isles and Scandinavia 
(similar to  current conditions there in the spring) and causing in- 
creased cyclone activity in the Mediterranean. 
Such conditions could only be expected in the near future if 
a permanent snow cover developed on Baffin Island and Labrador, 
which is not likely. Nor can a substantial increase in rainfall be 
reasonably expected along the north margins of the Sahara and 
Middle East deserts. More rain along their southern flanks might 
be possible, however, if subtropical anticyclones weaken slightly 
and shift toward higher latitudes. This would weaken the trade 
winds of the northern hemisphere and decrease coastal and equa- 
torial upwelling, which in turn would lead to greater oceanic evap- 
oration and to increased rainfall in the Sudan-Sahel belt of 
Africa. 
In recent times man has destroyed vegetation enough to 
create deserts by means of eroding soil, depleting groundwater, 
and increasing the salt content in the groundwater. To reverse such 
desertification processes seems possible only if large-scale rainfall 
triggers the growth of an adequate cover of vegetation that can be 
protected from overgrazing and the strains of population. Only in 
this situation could the weak positive feedback effect of "desert- 
ification-increasing albedo-increasing subsistence-less rainfall- 
extended desertification" be interrupted and possibly reversed. 
Much additional research of a broadly interdisciplinary 
nature is needed on the subject of man-made desertification. If 
such an effort is not forthcoming, it is doubtful whether a mild 
global warming would produce sufficient rainfall to  arrest the 
process in many of the areas where it now occurs. 

Speculation on global warming of 1 OC and 1.5 "C is relatively 
tangible. Such temperature increases could occur within 20-50 
years and leave ice sheets and sea level much the same as they 
are today. Similarly, as noted in the last chapter, looking back 
6,000 years for comparative temperatures does not evoke a time 
when boundary conditions were greatly different from today's. 
Looking a little farther into the future - and a lo t  farther into 
the past - to imagine an earth with a global average surface 
temperature 2.5 OC warmer than it is today is decidedly more 
conjectural. Nevertheless, taking note of what is known or reason- 
ably inferred about the interglacial period 120,000 years ago pro- 
vides useful insights into what the earth might be like, thanks to  
man-made global warming, between the years 2020 and 2050 or 
beyond. 
The last interglacial period 
Over the past 2.5 million years, at least 17 large-scale glacia- 
tions of northern continents have occurred. They have been inter- 
rupted by an equal number of interglacial periods when at  some 
point climatic conditions approximated those of the present day. 
Detailed information is available only for the more recent of these 
glacial fluctuations, and especially for the last glaciation between 
73,000 and 14,000 years ago. It had major glacial peaks at  its be- 
ginning and at its end, and there were at least five short periods 
of slightly warmer climate (interstadials). 
The most recent interglacial period continued from about 
130,000 years ago to  75,000 years ago, with two important inter- 
ruptions of cooling. Scientists know much about the climate in 
Europe and Asia during the period, but information on North 
America falls short of providing a regional description, and evidence 
from other continents is almost completely lacking. 
Climate during the earliest warming peak of the last inter- 
glacial period (the Eem interglacial) is now being investigated exten- 
sively. The warming, which peaked about 125,000 years ago, 
appears to make this period the warmest of all the interglacial 
periods of the last 2.5 million years. Climatic data from polar and 
mid-latitudes in Eurasia and North America indicate that tempera- 
tures were generally 2-3 OC higher than today, and it was slightly 
more humid. 
In northern and eastern Europe the climate was much more 
oceanic than at present, mainly because of a sea level 5-7 meters 
higher than today's. Scandinavia was isolated from the continent 
by an oceanic channel connecting the Baltic Sea and the White Sea. 
The sea also penetrated deeply into the continent in western 
Siberia along the Ob and Yenisey flood plains up to  a latitude of 
62 ON. 
Deciduous trees such as oak, linden, elm, and hazel prevailed 
in the poleward reaches of the temperate zones. Such forests also 
existed in eastern Siberia, indicating a marked retreat of permafrost 
to latitude 57 ON, compared to  50  ON today. Boreal forests ex- 
tended up to coastlines, suggesting that Arctic drift ice had retreated 
well away from the coasts. The coasts, however, were inundated 
by high sea levels. 
While marginal parts of the Arctic drift ice were probably 
displaced poleward, the central core of ice between Greenland, 
Alaska, and eastern Siberia has remained unchanged at least for 
the last 700,000 years. Yet the markedly warmer climate of the 
northern temperate zone can be illustrated by evidence that such 
animals as hippopotamuses, forest elephants, and lions roamed 
southern England during the last interglacial period 125,000 years 
ago. 
This warmest of known interglacial periods only lasted about 
10,000 years. It ended, as such periods commonly do, with an 
abrupt, short period of cooling, during which the global ice volume 
sharply increased, possibly causing sea level to  fall 60-70 meters, 
and then decreased. Atlantic polar ice remained north of latitude 
76 ON for about 8,000 years. Subtropical waters (which apparently 
did not get higher in the northern hemisphere than latitude 
44 ON in the Holocene period) reached 52 ON. 
Two other warm phases followed the peak period. In all inter- 
glacial periods for which sufficient information is available (except 
for the Holocene that continues today), abrupt cooling has lasted 
from a few centuries to no more than 1,000-2,000 years. These 
"abortive glaciations" seem to  recur not more than once in 10,000 
or  20,000 years. Their cause is unknown, but speculations have 
suggested clusters of volcanic explosions or  Antarctic surges as the 
triggering mechanisms. 
Life on a lopsided planet 
Flohn cites widely quoted estimates (see Chapter 6) that 
envisage projected increases in the use of fossil fuels as doubling 
atmospheric carbon dioxide around 2040. The best models of 
climate available (see Chapter 1) indicate that a doubling of car- 
bon dioxide and other trace gases would raise temperatures 2 ' to  
3 "C in low and middle latitudes and 5-10 "C in polar latitudes. 
Such a development could make it possible for a young child 
of today to  witness a remarkable climatic transformation within a 
normal life span. Global warming of 4 'C could cause Arctic drift 
ice t o  disappear completely, leaving an expanse of open water at 
the North Pole, while ice more than two kilometers thick remains 
over the land mass of the South Pole. The possibility is currently 
one of the more controversial subjects for scientists in climate- 
related research, but Flohn presents a strong case for it. 
Flohn points out that it has not yet been established conclu- 
sively that global warming of 4 "C would melt the Arctic ice, but 
he cites modeling efforts and paleoclirnatic evidence that both sup- 
port such an assumption. If 4 "C is somewhere near the tempera- 
ture increase needed to  trigger an ice-free Arctic, then such a possi- 
bility is well within the conceivable results of man-made global 
warming. 
Arctic ice floes are highly changeable. They vary greatly by 
season and from year to  year. The air-snow-ice-ocean system 
is particularly sensitive to oceanic heat flow, the albedo of the ice- 
"Hippopotamuses, forest elephants, and lions roamed south- 
ern England during the last interglacial period 1 2 5 , 0 0 0  
years ago." 
"During the remarkable cooling period 6.5-5 million years 
ago, the Arctic Ocean had a cool to temperate climate." 
snow surface during the melting season, and the length of the 
melting season (which normally ends with the first snow cover). 
The sea ice melts from above and freezes from below. During 
the melting season beginning in early spring, melting takes only 
50-60 days; snowmelt takes an additional 20 days. Currently the 
process shrinks the average mass of an ice floe by 15-20 percent. 
During the rest of the year, a similar amount of water freezes from 
below, replacing an average of 50 centimeters of ice per year. 
Over the last 1,000 years, marginal sections of Arctic drift ice 
have often demonstrated an ability to  disappear rapidly. However, 
as just noted, the central core of Arctic ice has been intact for at 
Today's areas of frequent droughts 
The map above indicates areas where frequent droughts occur in present 
times. It includes the permanently arid zones. An increase in global average 
surface temperature of 4 O C  could make large areas of the southern hemi- 
sphere more prone to drought and extend the drought areas of the northern 
hemisphere to include most of the highly industrialized areas of North 
America and Europe. Source: Daniel, H. (1980) Man and Climatic Variability, 
World Meteorological Organization, Geneva. 
least 700,000 years and possibly for 2.3 million years. During that 
span of time, as major glaciations have alternated with warmer 
interglacial periods, global warming has probably not raised global 
average surface temperature more than 2.5 O C  above today's levels. 
Just before large-scale glaciation of the northern continents 
began some 2.5 million years ago, the earth was wanner. Evidence 
now available indicates conclusively that the Arctic Ocean was 
then substantially ice-free and the Antarctic continent covered 
with an ice dome for a period of at least ten million years between 
about 12 million and 2.5 million years ago. 
This period, the late tertiary, had boundary conditions differ- 
ing from today's, but locations of continents, oceans, and atmos- 
pheric currents were enough like those now existing to permit use- 
ful comparisons. An ice-free North Pole and an icebound South 
Pole probably also existed for 20-30 million years during the Permo- 
Carboniferous glacial period about 250 million years ago, but then 
boundaries were vastly different. For example, several continents 
including the Antarctic formed a supercontinent (Gondwana) in 
the high latitudes of the southern hemisphere. 
For the last 12 million years or  longer, the Antarctic continent 
has been under more or less constant glaciation. From 12 million 
to 2.5 million years ago, the Arctic Ocean was in a fairly stable ice- 
free condition. Then began the sequence of glacial and interglacial 
periods that continues today. 
At the end of the period of an ice-free Arctic and a glaciated 
Antarctic - about 3-5 million years ago - our early ancestors, 
the hominids, had just learned to  use stones as weapons and tools 
in the savannas of equatorial East Africa. The climatic changes 
then occurring may have influenced the evolution of the species. 
The Antarctic ice dome reached its glacial maximum for the 
ten-million-year period of an ice-free Arctic around 6.5-5 million 
years ago. The dome must have been several hundred meters higher 
then, with a volume of ice significantly greater than today's. 
Global cooling occurred, cold Antarctic surface waters extended 
300 kilometers farther north, and strong upwelling took place in 
the equatorial Pacific. 
One of the most important consequences of this cooling phase 
was a drop in sea level of 40-50 meters below today's level, a 
result of water storage in the Antarctic ice dome. The Gibraltar 
area water receded, cutting off the Mediterranean Sea, which eva- 
porated eight or ten times to a depth of 3,700 meters and refilled, 
leaving a laminated salt layer 300-500 meters thick. 
During this remarkable cooling period 6.5-5 million years 
ago, the Arctic Ocean had a cool t o  temperate climate. Boreal for- 
ests extended to the northernmost tips of land. The entire north 
continental shelf of Asia and Alaska was then dry, and the north- 
ern continents extended 200-600 kilometers farther north. Siberia 
then reached latitude 8 1 O N ,  Canada 83 ON. 
Just before the first appearance of ice on the European con- 
tinent about 2.5 million years ago, Siberia was evidently free of 
tundra and widespread permafrost. Summer temperatures were 
probably 4-5 "C higher than now, winter temperatures at least 
5-10 OC higher. Since mountains in the area were lower, oceanic 
rainfall penetrated farther inland, making annual rainfall 300- 
400 millimeters greater than at present. 
In a few areas - Iceland, Greenland, and even in the high 
mountains of California - glaciers probably formed along with 
boreal forests, but this produced no significant large-scale climatic 
effect. Along the coasts of Alaska, well-developed boreal mixed 
forests extended more than 800 kilometers north of present tree 
lines. Fossil insects of the time at latitude 66  ON resemble those 
now living at latitude 48-50 O N  (the Vancouver-Seattle area). 
The southern hemisphere's climate from 5 t o  2 million years 
ago may have been at times as cool as the peaks of the long glacial- 
interglacial age that followed. The Ross ice shelf in Antarctica 
extended beyond its present boundary. Glaciation started in south- 
ern South America about 3.6 million years ago. From observations 
of ice-rafted pebbles it has been inferred that as cold Antarctic 
surface water shifted northward, Antarctic tabular icebergs reached 
farther north than previously. 
Arid parts of the north temperate zone extended farther 
northward before the glaciers came. From 6.5 to  5 million years 
ago, even southcentral Europe was partly arid, with steppe or desert 
vegetation reaching nearly to Vienna. Southwest Germany was 
much drier than now, and in what is now the US, the dry belt 
included most areas west of the Mississippi River. 
In the tropics, savanna climates with seasonal rains were 
much more extensive than they are today, but the equatorial rain 
forekt with all-year rain waq much smaller. While the southern 
Sahara was covered with a tropical humid or semihumid vegetation 
(which now remains in southern Nigeria), southern Africa and the 
Zaire basin were dry and sometimes fully covered with desert. 
Similar aridity occurred in northern Australia after the peak of 
Antarctic glaciation 6.5-5 million years ago. 
The evidence suggests that the hemispheric asymmetry of 
both atmospheric and oceanic circulations was substantially greater 
than now during the long period of an ice-free Arctic. The average 
annual temperature difference between Arctic and Antarctic was 
then on the order of 20 "C; now it is about 11 "C. It appears that 
the northern subtropical high-pressure belt reached 43-45 ON, 
compared to its present northern limit of 37 ON. The southern 
The edge of the Arctic ice. Here i s  the terminus of the Arctic frozen wastes 
in the fjords of Norway. Ice sheet size is a boundary condition that can 
change rapidly, and i t  augments the prevailing temperature trend, so that 
during a warming phase temperatures are further increased by the contrac- 
tion of the ice sheet as i t  reflects less solar radiation. Land and water both 
absorb more solar heat than ice. (Photo courtesy of International Com- 
munication Agency .) 
subtropical belt probably reached about as far south as it does 
today, to  31 "S. 
During summers, the rorthern subtropical belt probably 
shifted no more than 100-200 kilometers northward. But in 
winters the belt may have displaced northward by 800 kilometers 
or more. If these particular paleoclirnatic conditions were to  
repeat, winter rains would be reduced drastically in California, the 
Mediterranean, the Middle East all the way to  Turkestan in the 
USSR, and the Punjab region of India. Summer droughts would 
probably be frequent in a belt from 45 ON to 50 ON. 
Although the northern subtropical belt would shift to  the 
north, the southern subtropical belt would remain constant with 
global warming of 4 OC. The hottest belt of the earth, its "meteor- 
ological equator," would then shift northward from its present 
position at 6 ON to a latitude of 9-10 ON. In northern winter, 
equatorial rain would probably remain in a belt between the mathe- 
matical equator and latitude 20 ON, reaching south of the equator 
only rarely. This rain is actually the tropical summer rain of the 
southern hemisphere, and such a marked decrease in its amount 
would lead to a natural desertification of areas in the belt be- 
tween the equator and 20 "S, including Brazil, central Africa, and 
Indonesia. 
The drought would probably be made more severe by more 
frequent and more intense equatorial upwelling that would drasti- 
cally reduce oceanic evaporation in much of the area, especially 
during the southern winter, when the meteorological equator 
reaches its northernmost position. Strong equatorial upwelling 
(and no El Niiio) would be likely in the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, 
although it is not known to have occurred at any time in the 
Indian Ocean. 
The amount by which sea levels might rise as a result of global 
warming can only be put in round numbers. When drift ice melts, 
sea level stays the same, just as the water line in a drink stays the 
same as an ice cube melts. Within the next 100 years a significant 
worldwide rise in sea level could only be caused by large-scale 
surges of the Antarctic ice cap. As a rough gauge, each 100,000 
cubic kilometers of ice slide could be expected t o  raise sea level 25 
centimeters, and a slide of less than 100,000 cubic kilometers 
would probably not affect sea level significantly. 
The most recent ice slide of sufficient size to  raise sea level 
may have occurred during the last interglacial period, when an 
Antarctic ice surge of some 2 million cubic kilometers could 
account for a 5-meter rise in sea level at that time. Flohn says the 
risk of such an event recurring as a result of a 4 "C increase in 
global warming is not great during the next century o r  so. 
Nor does he consider it likely that the continental ice caps 
of the Antarctic and of Greenland would melt soon after the 
North Pole. Even with an ice-free Arctic, Greenland would get 
more winter snowfall due to  increased cyclone activity and probably 
retain the bulk of its glaciation. But the risks of  rising sea level 
should not be completely disregarded, even though, as we have 
just seen, the risks of a large-scale shift of climatic belts due to 
global warming are far greater. 

Anyone unwilling t o  regard man-made global warming as a 
serious problem could argue as follows: 
"The experts know so little about climate that they can offer 
nothing more than a far-ranging choice of  future possibilities. They 
have no  idea whether global warming will melt the Arctic ice, o r  
whether a cluster of  volcanic eruptions will trigger a period of  cool- 
ing. Either way, widespread disruption results. Burning less fossil 
fuel is no  answer. It would surely cause privation now, and it 
could hasten the arrival of  a new ice age." 
The fallacy of the argument above is that,  while man-made 
global warming could bring on the future possibilities Flohn sug- 
gests, it is not likely that a cooling large enough to  matter will 
occur during the next 100 years. Convincing evidence from ocean 
cores shows that over the last 450,000 years, the great glaciations 
have coincided with long-term variations in the earth's orbit that 
alter its distance from the sun. It  suggests that glaciation similar t o  
that of 18,000 years ago is not likely for  5,000-50,000 years. 
The onset of a new ice age within a century has a very low 
probability, considering the paleoclimatic frequency of such events. 
The conditions that could trigger it - a rapid decrease in solar 
radiation, a surge of a million cubic kilometers o r  more of  Antarctic 
ice, o r  a cluster of strong volcanic eruptions - are extremely rare, 
and they remain unpredictable. 
Some practical conclusions 
If atmospheric carbon dioxide content continues to  rise, and 
if other man-made trace gases continue adding another 5 0  percent 
Nonfossil options 
. . . Nevertheless in view of the present uncertainties in quantify- 
ing the effects of carbon dioxide, it seems premature to  recom- 
mend only those energy strategies that actively discourage the 
use of fossil fuels. At the same time, in view of the probable 
climatic implications of increased concentration of carbon 
dioxide in the atmosphere, it would be unwise to  build future 
energy strategies that continue t o  rely greatly on the use of fossil 
fuels. A prudent policy, in our opinion, would be to have suffi- 
cient nonfossil options incorporated in the energy supply system 
over the next few decades so as to  allow expansion from that 
base, i f  necessary, as the effects o f  carbon dioxide become better 
quantifiable through further research. 
- Energy Systems Program of  the Inter- 
national Institute for Applied Systems 
Analysis, W. HSele, Program Leader, 
Energy in a Finite World: A Global Sys- 
tems Analysis, Ballinger, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, 1981. 
or more to  the greenhouse effect of infrared absorption, develop- 
ments similar to those outlined in Chapters 7 and 8 could be ex- 
pected. The last interglacial period 120,000 years ago serves as a 
guide to what might happen if carbon dioxide and other trace gases 
in the atmosphere rise from the current level, estimated by Flohn to 
be 335 parts per million (ppm), to about 610 ppm. The average 
global warming would then be about 2.5 OC. 
The consequences of a 2.5 OC increase in global average sur- 
face temperature would be climatic changes more drastic than any 
man has experienced over the last 10,000 years. In some regions 
the effects on man would be benign, in others beneficial, and in 
many others catastrophic. 
The real danger, however, comes when the carbon dioxide 
and other trace-gas content is greater than a doubling. Flohn refers 
to what he sees as the decisive threshold, which he sets at some- 
where between 550 and 750 ppm of carbon dioxide and other trace 
gases, or  between 800 and 1,100 ppm for carbon dioxide alone. 
Beyond this amount of man-made gas release, the probability of 
an evolution toward an ice-free Arctic Ocean increases greatly. 
Not only could Arctic melting occur rapidly - within a few decades 
or less - it would be irreversible once the central core of Arctic ice 
had gonz. As noted, an ice-free Arctic and a large dome of Antarctic 
ice coexisted for no less than 10 million years just before the present 
Arctic ice core began to  form. 
The evolution of an ice-free Arctic could lead, possibly after 
a series of catastrophic weather extremes, to a displacement of 
today's climatic zones by 400-800 kilometers. The problems that 
this could cause for mankind are enormous. 
"Not only could Arctic melting occur rapidly, it would be 
irreversible once the core of Arctic ice had gone." 
A report by an IIASA working group of specialists has con- 
cluded that mankind can afford between five and ten years for 
"vigorous research and planning" to narrow the uncertainties 
enough to justify changes in energy policies that would avert the 
kind of future described here. 
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